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NOTES 
TWELVE INJURED MEN:                            
WHY INJURED JURORS SHOULD NOT 
RECEIVE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION 
COVERAGE FROM THE COURTS 
COREY BARON† 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1923, Mary Rogers dutifully completed the most 
honorable civic responsibility—jury duty.1  Due to the late hour, 
the elevators in the courthouse were out of service, so she had to 
take the stairs.2  When she descended the stairs, she fell and 
fractured her hip.3  Thereafter, Ms. Rogers filed a workers’ 
compensation claim.4  It was the first time in United States 
history that an injured juror sought workers’ compensation.5  
Unfortunately for Ms. Rogers, the Industrial Commission of Ohio 
denied her claim.6  Ms. Rogers’ case, however, went all the way to 
 
† Senior Articles Editor, St. John’s Law Review, J.D. Candidate, 2018, St. John’s 
University School of Law; B.A., 2014, Binghamton University. The author expresses 
warm gratitude to Professor Robert A. Ruescher for his guidance, insight, and 
mentorship.  The author is also grateful to the entire St. John’s Law Review editorial 
board for its dedicated efforts throughout this process. Finally, the author is 
thankful to his parents for their unwavering love and support. 
1 Indus. Comm’n v. Rogers, 171 N.E. 35, 35 (Ohio 1930). 
2 Id. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. In this Note, “Workers’ Compensation” is used in lieu of “Workman’s 
Compensation” and “Workmens’ Compensation.” 
5 See Jochen v. County of Saginaw, 110 N.W.2d 780, 781 (Mich. 1961) 
(describing the then-existing workers’ compensation precedent regarding jurors 
across the United States); Rogers v. Indus. Comm’n, 27 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 256, 257 
(C.P. Hamilton County 1928) (“The question as to whether or not jurors are entitled 
to the benefits of the Workmen’s Compensation Act seems never to have been before 
the courts of this state, nor of any of the states having workmen’s compensation 
laws.”), aff’d sub nom. Indus. Comm’n v. Rogers, 170 N.E. 600 (Ohio Ct. App. 1929), 
aff’d, 171 N.E. 35 (Ohio 1930). 
6 Rogers, 27 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) at 257. 
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the Supreme Court of Ohio, which granted her workers’ 
compensation claim on the grounds that she was an employee of 
the county at the time she fell.7 
Though the Rogers court set an initial precedent that jurors 
should receive workers’ compensation,8 other courts have by and 
large reached the contrary conclusion.  That is to say, most 
courts presented with this issue found that jurors were not 
eligible for workers’ compensation.9  One such court felt the 
answer was so obvious that it wrote a particularly memorable 
opinion—composed of only four numbered points.10 
There are, however, a minority of courts that reached the 
same conclusion as the Rogers court.11  The opposing conclusions 
exist because workers’ compensation claims are based on 
individual state workers’ compensation statutes, which have 
different statutory structures and applicable common laws.12  In 
 
7 See Rogers, 171 N.E. at 36–37 (holding that Mary attained employment by 
virtue of appointment for hire); see also Jochen, 110 N.W.2d at 781. 
8 See Rogers, 171 N.E. at 36–37. 
9 See, e.g., Metropolitan Dade County v. Glassman, 341 So. 2d 995, 996 (Fla. 
1976) (“In holding respondent ineligible for workmen’s compensation benefits, we 
align ourselves with the weight of authority in other jurisdictions.”); Jaskoviak v. 
Indus. Comm’n, 785 N.E.2d 1026, 1029 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) (“The majority of cases 
from other jurisdictions have answered this question by deciding that a juror is not 
an employee.”); Wilson v. Georgetown County, 447 S.E.2d 841, 842 (S.C. 1994) (“The 
majority rule is that a juror is not within the scope of workers’ compensation laws.”). 
10 The Supreme Court of New Mexico wrote its opinion with incredible brevity. 
The entire opinion follows: 
{1} The question for decision: Is a juror who suffers an accidental injury 
while in the performance of his duties as such entitled to an award of 
compensation for his injury under the provisions of our Workmen’s 
Compensation Law, 1953 Comp. § 59–10–1 et seq.? 
{2} The learned trial judge said nay. So say we. 
{3} The judgment will be affirmed. 
{4} It is so ordered. 
Seward v. County of Bernalillo, 294 P.2d 625, 625 (N.M. 1956) (internal citation 
omitted). 
11 See, e.g., Yount v. Boundary County, 796 P.2d 516, 526–27 (Idaho 1990); 
Holmgren v. N.D. Workers Comp. Bureau, 455 N.W.2d 200, 206 (N.D. 1990); Bolin v. 
Kitsap County, 785 P.2d 805, 808 (Wash. 1990). 
12 Robert A. Naragon, Note, Jurors as Nonvoluntary Employees Under 
Workmen’s Compensation Law, 74 DICK. L. REV. 334, 335 (1970); David B. Torrey & 
Lawrence D. McIntyre, Recent Developments in Workers’ Compensation and 
Employers’ Liability Law, 51 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 749, 750 (2016). Bolin 
also acknowledged this legal nuance. See Bolin, 785 P.2d at 807 (“This court must 
interpret Washington’s statute, not those of other states. Under the language, 
statutory scheme, and cases construing our act, we conclude that jurors are 
employees.”) (emphasis added). 
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fact, some states require all employers and employees to 
participate in their workers’ compensation programs, some states 
simply grant eligible employers and employees the option to 
participate in their workers’ compensation programs, and some 
states both require designated classes of employers and 
employees to participate and allow other eligible classes to 
participate at their discretion.13  As a result, “the direct effect of 
[workers’ compensation] laws and case precedents outside of 
their state of origin is limited.”14  Simply put, because the state 
statutes and precedents vary, the legal conclusions should vary 
too. 
Those differences yielded inconsistent holdings as to whether 
injuries sustained in the course of jury duty merit workers’ 
compensation coverage.  Though claims regarding such injuries 
are a unique subset of workers’ compensation cases, individuals 
have brought a variety of workers’ compensation claims for 
injuries sustained in the course of jury service.  Some examples 
include trampling by a crowd exiting a courthouse elevator,15 
falling out of the jury box,16 enduring a car accident en route 
home from jury service,17 and even contracting pneumonia during 
the deliberation process.18 
Though one state, Puerto Rico, and the federal government 
specifically addressed this issue in their statutes,19 claimants in 
states without such express statutory provisions had to litigate 
the issue.20  Consequently, this body of case law has yielded four 
different holdings:  (1) jurors are eligible for coverage because of 
how the statutes have been interpreted,21 (2) public policy  
 
 
13 Naragon, supra note 12, at 335. 
14 Id.; Torrey & McIntyre, supra note 12, at 750; see also Bolin, 785 P.2d at 807. 
15 Metropolitan Dade County v. Glassman, 341 So. 2d 995, 996 (Fla. 1976). 
16 Waggener v. County of Los Angeles, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 141, 142 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1995). 
17 Bolin, 785 P.2d at 805. 
18 Bd. of Comm’rs v. Evans, 60 P.2d 225, 226 (Colo. 1936). The juror alleged that 
he contracted pneumonia because, after the jury failed to reach a verdict by 
midnight, he was compelled to lodge at the county jail on a small mattress absent 
blankets. Id. 
19 5 U.S.C.A. § 8101 (West 2014); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 9-402 (West 
2017); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 11, § 2 (2017). 
20 Infra Parts II and III. 
21 See, e.g., Holmgren v. N.D. Workers Comp. Bureau, 455 N.W.2d 200, 206 
(N.D. 1990). 
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requires jurors’ eligibility,22 (3) jurors are not eligible for coverage 
because of how the statutes have been interpreted,23 and 
(4) public policy precludes jurors’ eligibility.24 
New York, however, has not addressed whether jurors are 
eligible for workers’ compensation through the court system.25  A 
case on this issue would be one of first impression in New York.  
Therefore, one cannot predict how New York courts would rule on 
the issue, because on the one hand, the courts could strictly 
follow the statute’s language and conclude that jurors are not 
eligible for coverage.26  On the other hand, the policy of broadly 
and liberally applying New York’s Workers’ Compensation Law27 
could lead New York courts to, like other courts,28 rule that jurors 
should receive coverage.29 
 
22 See, e.g., Waggener v. County of Los Angeles, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 141, 144 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1995); Yount v. Boundary County, 796 P.2d 516, 526–27 (Idaho 1990). 
23 See, e.g., Jaskoviak v. Indus. Comm’n, 785 N.E.2d 1026, 1028–30 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2003). 
24 See, e.g., Metropolitan Dade County v. Glassman, 341 So. 2d 995, 996 (Fla. 
1976). 
25 On the other hand, New York’s Workers’ Compensation Board has addressed 
this issue twice. N.Y. State Dep’t of Agric. & Mkts, 2006 WL 2848881, at *3 (N.Y. 
Workers’ Comp. Bd. Sept. 22, 2006); Orange Cty. Home & Infirmary, 1988 WL 
189663, at *1 (N.Y. Workers’ Comp. Bd. June 6, 1988). For different reasons, both 
Workers’ Compensation Boards ruled that the claimant-jurors were ineligible for 
workers compensation coverage. Compare N.Y. State Dep’t of Agric. & Mkts, 2006 
WL 2848881, at *3 (holding that “as a matter of public policy New York State does 
not allow jurors to be employees of a governmental entity whose cases they may be 
judging”), with Orange Cty. Home & Infirmary, 1988 WL 189663, at *1 (holding that 
a jury service “is in a manner similar to that of a militiaman serving the State as 
neither have certain rights and privileges of other working men and women, such as 
the choice as to work or not according to their own free will”) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
26 The statute provides coverage for specific groups of employment and 
occupational diseases. N.Y. WORKERS’ COMP. LAW § 3 (McKinney 2017). Group 17, 
which lists the employees that municipalities must cover, does not list jurors. Id. 
Jurors could, however, fit in to Group 19, which grants municipalities the option to 
cover employees not listed in Group 17. Id. Select jurors could also arguably fit in to 
Group 16, which provides workers’ compensation coverage to those under 
“employment by the state” when the state pays wages pursuant to employment. Id. 
27 E.g., Neacosia v. N.Y. Power Auth., 649 N.E.2d 1188, 1191, 85 N.Y.2d 471, 
476, 626 N.Y.S.2d 44, 47 (N.Y. 1995); Lemon v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 528 N.E.2d 
1205, 1207, 72 N.Y.2d 324, 326, 532 N.Y.S.2d 732, 734 (N.Y. 1988); Smith v. 
Tompkins Cty. Courthouse, 459 N.E.2d 155, 156, 60 N.Y.2d 939, 941, 471 N.Y.S.2d 
46, 47 (N.Y. 1983). 
28 See Waggener, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 144 (noting that covering jurors is “wholly 
consistent with the broad purposes of the Act . . . .”) (emphasis added); Yount, 796 
P.2d at 522 (noting that workers’ compensation law was to be “liberally construed” 
and holding the court’s task was, in considering whether jurors should be covered, 
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This Note argues that the legislature should add a provision 
to New York’s Workers’ Compensation Act that expressly 
precludes jurors from coverage.30  Such a provision would 
comport with the policy underlying the statute, the statute’s 
structure, and the statute’s language.  Moreover, that legislative 
provision would prevent the court from wasting the considerable 
time and expense of grappling with other courts’ inconsistent 
interpretations of workers’ compensation statutes and their 
underlying policies.31  First, Part I of this Note provides an 
overview of the workers’ compensation law and explores the 
policies underlying the advent of workers’ compensation statutes.  
Then, Part II surveys and presents the six methods for 
determining whether jurors are entitled to workers’ 
compensation coverage.  Finally, Part III discusses the need for 
clarification by the legislature, while Part IV of this Note 
evaluates the suggestion for an additional statutory clause that 
explicitly precludes jurors from eligibility for workers’ 
compensation. 
I. THE FUNCTION OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION 
Workers’ compensation is a statutory system that provides 
comprehensive medical and financial benefits to employees who 
suffer work-related injuries.32  The system benefits both 
employers and employees; it grants injured workers medical 
coverage and scheduled income benefits—regardless of their fault 
in causing their injuries—and provides employers with immunity 
from litigation and, therefore, the threat of compensatory and 
 
“to ascertain if the provisions of the [workers’ compensation] statute[] are capable of 
being so interpreted . . . .”). 
29 This Note will discuss in greater detail how some courts, including New York, 
interpret workers’ compensation statutes broadly, which can lead to finding coverage 
for jurors in the interest of that policy. See infra Parts III and IV. 
30 This Note does not, however, engage in a philosophical assessment as to 
whether jurors should otherwise receive remuneration for injuries they sustain in 
the course of performing jury duty. This Note’s discussion is strictly limited to the 
concept of providing jurors with Workers’ Compensation coverage. 
31 See Torrey & McIntyre, supra note 12, at 750 (explaining that, in the context 
of Workers’ Compensation, state courts “often look to authority from other states” 
when “no precedent of the jurisdiction is determinative”). See Part III for an 
explanation of the states’ inconsistent jurisprudence. 
32 Joan T.A. Gabel et al., The New Relationship Between Injured Worker and 
Employer: An Opportunity for Restructuring the System, 35 AM. BUS. L.J. 403, 403 
(1998). 
FINAL_BARON 6/16/2018  11:34 AM 
962 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91:957 
punitive damages.33  The system creates a relationship between 
employers and employees such that “benefits are shared in a way 
that maximizes their joint profits . . . .”34  Put simply, the 
combination of the employers’ strict liability for making Worker’s 
Compensation payments and the employees’ limited ability to 
collect damages act as a prearranged settlement for work-related 
injury claims.35  The system operates on the basis that the costs 
of the system will pass to the consumer.36 
Workers’ compensation statutes resulted from the plights 
faced by nineteenth century workers.  Prior to the advent of 
workers’ compensation, employees often refrained from testifying 
against their employers because they feared retaliatory 
termination.37  Meanwhile, the typical legal defenses of 
contributory negligence, negligence of fellow employees, and 
assumption of risk shielded employers from adverse judgments.38  
By the end of the nineteenth century, however, the substantial 
increase in work-related accidents, an unfortunate byproduct of 
industrial development, yielded a demand for an efficient 
mechanism to compensate injured workers.39  That demand 
caught the attention of state legislatures, which led to the 
adoption of workers’ compensation statutes across the United 
States.40  As long as workers’ compensation statutes remain in 
effect, they reflect the need to protect workers engaged in 
dangerous work. 
II. THE SIX RATIONALES FOR CONCLUDING WHETHER A JUROR IS 
ELIGIBLE FOR WORKERS’ COMPENSATION 
Barry Stevens was summoned to jury duty.  He sat through 
voir dire and was selected for trial.  Unfortunately, on the first 
day of the trial, Barry Stevens tripped, fell out of the jury box, 
 
33 Id. at 403; Torrey & McIntyre, supra note 12, at 753. 
34 Gabel et al., supra note 32, at 406–07. 
35 Id. at 407; see Torrey & McIntyre, supra note 12, at 753. 
36 Roger C. Henderson, Should Workmen’s Compensation Be Extended to 
Nonoccupational Injuries?, 48 TEX. L. REV. 117, 119 (1969); Eugene Wambaugh, 
Workmen’s Compensation Acts: Their Theory and Their Constitutionality, 25 HARV. 
L. REV. 129, 130 (1911); Gabel et al., supra note 32, at 406. 
37 Gabel et al., supra note 32, at 405. 
38 Richard A. Epstein, The Historical Origins and Economic Structure of 
Workers’ Compensation Law, 16 GA. L. REV. 775, 775–76 (1982); Gabel et al., supra 
note 32, at 405–406. 
39 Epstein, supra note 38, at 775; Gabel et al., supra note 32, at 406. 
40 Epstein, supra note 38, at 776; Gabel et al., supra note 32, at 406. 
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and broke his wrist when the court adjourned for lunch.41  Barry 
Stevens’ ability to reap the benefits of workers’ compensation 
depends on the approach taken by the state in which he fell.42 
The divergence in case law regarding jurors’ eligibility for 
workers’ compensation benefits resulted from conflicting 
interpretations of workers’ compensation statutes and their 
underlying policies.  In the Sections that follow, this Note 
explores these different interpretations and policies as well as 
express statutory provisions that address jurors. 
A. Statutory Mandates That Address Jurors’ Eligibility To 
Receive Workers’ Compensation 
The first approach is to expressly address jurors in workers’ 
compensation statutes.  Only two workers’ compensation statutes 
expressly provide that jurors are eligible for workers’ 
compensation.  First, Puerto Rico’s workers’ compensation 
statute specifies that jurors have workers’ compensation coverage 
“from the time they leave their homes until they return to them, 
whether they have served as jurors or not.”43  Second, Maryland’s 
workers’ compensation statute also requires that jurors receive 
coverage.44 
The U.S. federal statute operates in the same manner.  
Indeed, Title 5 of the United States Code contains the federal 
equivalent of a workers’ compensation statute; it provides 
coverage for federal employees.45  Much like Puerto Rico’s and 
Maryland’s statutes, the Code’s definitions section states that 
each individual “serving as a petit or grand juror”  is within the 
 
41 I will use this hypothetical throughout this Note to illustrate the approaches 
to and results from injuries sustained by jurors. 
42 For the discussion of how this issue is handled in federal courts, see infra 
Part II.A. 
43 P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 11, § 2 (2017). 
44 MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 9-402(b) (West 2017) (“The State shall secure 
compensation for jurors by maintaining insurance with the Chesapeake Employers’ 
Insurance Company and paying to the Company the premiums set by the Board for 
the Company as necessary to provide compensation for jurors.”). Interestingly, 
Maryland passed that statute after the Court of Appeals of Maryland, in Lockerman 
v. Prince George’s County, held that jurors were not eligible for coverage. 377 A.2d 
1177, 1183–84 (Md. 1977). 
45 “The United States shall pay compensation as specified by this subchapter for 
the disability or death of an employee resulting from personal injury sustained while 
in the performance of his duty . . . .” 5 U.S.C. § 8102 (2012) (emphasis added). 
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definition of “employee.”46  Therefore, if Barry Stevens sustained 
his injury in any of those jurisdictions, he would obtain workers’ 
compensation benefits. 
B. Statutory Interpretation 
The second approach to this issue is to consider and interpret 
the general language of the relevant statute.  This is the courts’ 
most common approach to the issue.47  However, despite the use 
of the same method, the state courts have come out on both sides.  
This further muddies the water and, unfortunately, makes 
uniformity nearly impossible. 
1. Finding Jurors Ineligible for Workers’ Compensation 
By and large, courts construed workers’ compensation 
statutes to conclude  jurors were ineligible for workers’ 
compensation.48  Some courts held so because jurors did not fit 
the statutory definition of “employee.”49  Accordingly, courts often 
found that jurors were not employees because there was no 
contract for hire between jurors and the court system.50  Indeed, 
the Louisiana Court of Appeals held that “[e]mployment 
presupposes an agreement entered into between two parties.  In 
the relationship between a juror and the parish there is no 
agreement.”51  By the same token, the Supreme Court of Colorado 
 
46 5 U.S.C. § 8101 (2012). 
47 See, e.g., Hicks v. Guilford County, 148 S.E.2d 240, 242–44 (N.C. 1966); 
Holmgren v. N.D. Workers Comp. Bureau, 455 N.W.2d 200, 206 (N.D. 1990); Bolin v. 
Kitsap County, 785 P.2d 805, 805–06 (Wash. 1990). 
48 See, e.g., Bd. of Comm’rs v. Evans, 60 P.2d 225, 227 (Colo. 1936); Jaskoviak v. 
Indus. Comm’n, 785 N.E.2d 1026, 1030 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003); Hicks, 148 S.E.2d at 244. 
49 See, e.g., Evans, 60 P.2d at 227 (noting that jurors are not specified in the 
statute in the definition of employee); Silagy v. State, 253 A.2d 478, 479 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 1969) (discussing lack of “broad coverage” provided in statute by virtue 
of the statutory definition of “employee”); Hicks, 148 S.E.2d at 244 (finding that the 
workers’ compensation did not apply to injuries sustained by jurors because they did 
not meet definition of employee). 
50 See, e.g., Evans, 60 P.2d at 226 (“We cannot think the status of a juror is that 
of an employee serving, to quote the statute, by ‘appointment or contract of hire, 
express or implied.’ ”); Jaskoviak, 785 N.E.2d at 1028–29 (noting that the absence of 
an employment agreement shows that a juror is not an employee); Lockerman v. 
Prince George’s County, 377 A.2d 1177, 1181 (Md. 1977) (holding that “the normal 
contractual incidents of the employer-employee relationship are required” for any 
person to be covered under the Workers’ Compensation Act); Hicks, 148 S.E.2d at 
244 (noting that juror’s services, are not “obtained or defined” by a contract of hire). 
51 Jeansonne v. Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 11663 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/28/77); 354 
So. 2d 619, 620. In Louisiana, the “parish” is the equivalent of the county. See 
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concluded that jurors were not eligible for workers’ compensation 
because “[t]he county does not negotiate with a citizen for his 
services as a juror, nor does the citizen apply to the county for 
such preferment.”52  Other courts have echoed that sentiment.53  
Moreover, courts often find that jurors are not employees despite 
claimants’ arguments that jurors are employees by virtue of 
“appointment for hire.”54 
Thus, if Barry Stevens were summoned to jury duty in any of 
the preceding jurisdictions, he would not receive workers’ 
compensation coverage for his injury.  His denial would be based 
on any combination of the following:  He would not meet the 
statutory definition of an employee; he would not have a contract 
underlying his service; he would not have attained the position 
through appointment; he could not have applied for the position; 
and he could not have negotiated his compensation. 
2. Finding Jurors Eligible for Workers’ Compensation 
In three instances, courts have found, through construing 
their state’s workers compensation statutes, that jurors are 
eligible for coverage.55  First, the Supreme Court of Ohio found 
that its statute covered jurors when it held that jurors were 
“appointed . . . for hire,” even though jurors could not turn down 
appointment, because the counties compensated jurors for their 
services.56  Notably, the Ohio court found that jurors were not 
within the “official of the state or of the county” exception to that  
 
 
Louisiana Supreme Court History, LOUISIANA SUPREME COURT, http://www.lasc.org/ 
about_the_court/history.asp (last visited Mar. 24, 2018). 
52 Evans, 60 P.2d at 226. 
53 See O’Malley’s Case, 281 N.E.2d 277, 279 (Mass. 1972); Hicks, 148 S.E.2d at 
244. 
54 See, e.g., Evans, 60 P.2d at 227 (finding that “in no conceivable sense” are 
jurors appointed for hire); Jaskoviak, 785 N.E.2d at 1029 (deciding against 
claimant’s argument that placement on the jury commission’s jury list amounted to 
an appointment for hire); Hicks, 148 S.E.2d at 244 (noting that the juror was neither 
“appointed nor elected to his position of duty”). For an explanation of “appointment 
for fire” see infra Part III.A. 
55 See Holmgren v. N.D. Workers Comp. Bureau, 455 N.W.2d 200, 206 (N.D. 
1990); Indus. Comm’n v. Rogers, 171 N.E. 35, 37 (Ohio 1930); Bolin v. Kitsap 
County, 785 P.2d 805, 807–08 (Wash. 1990). 
56 See Rogers, 171 N.E. at 36–37 (“[T]he fact that the juror has no option to 
decline such appointment [does not] render the appointment any less one for hire, 
since theoretically the consideration provided by law for the service is adequate.”). 
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state’s workers’ compensation coverage,57 because jurors’ 
decisions were not final and a judge could refuse to enter the 
jury’s verdict.58 
Second, the Supreme Court of North Dakota interpreted its 
workers’ compenstation statute to determine that its statute 
covered jurors.  That court noted that the state’s workers’ 
compensation statute included “appointed officials” in its 
definition of employees.59  The court then applied the state’s 
common-law test for determining whether individuals were 
“appointed officials,”60 which necessitated an analysis of whether 
jurors possessed the traits of “officials of the state.”61  The court 
concluded that jurors were eligible for workers’ compensation 
because jurors possessed the traits of “state officials,” which 
meant they were “appointed officials” within the statutory 
definition of “employee.”62 
Third, the Supreme Court of Washington also interpreted its 
statute to determine its jurors were eligible for workers’ 
compensation.63  The court noted that the Washington workers’ 
compensation statute defined “employee” as including “officers of 
the state.”64  Moreover, the statute only listed the excluded 
categories of employment.65  Accordingly, the court reasoned that 
jurors could be employees because they were not on the list of 
exclusions.66  However, before it found that jurors could receive 
coverage, the court answered the remaining questions of whether 
they were “employees,” despite the involuntary nature of jury 
 
57 Id. at 35–36. 
58 Id. at 36.  
59 Holmgren, 455 N.W.2d at 202 (interpreting N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 65–01–
02 (West 2015). 
60 The criteria for a finding that individuals are public officials required that 
such people achieved their positions by election or appointment, were compensated 
from public funds, and performed statutorily defined duties, of a continuous nature, 
which related to the administration of state government. Id. at 202. 
61 The court evaluated jurors’ “importance, dignity, and independence,” in 
addition to the common-law “public officials” test, out of respect for the state 
attorney general after the attorney general issued a report stating that those 
characteristics are inherent in public officials. Id. at 204 (internal quotations 
omitted). 
62 See id. at 205 (concluding that jurors are public officials in the context of 
workers’ compensation because “juror[s] fulfill[] all of the Jorgenson requirements” 
and satisfy the “importance, dignity and independence test . . . .”). 
63 Bolin v. Kitsap County, 785 P.2d 805, 805 (Wash. 1990). 
64 Id.; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 51.08.185 (West 2017). 
65 Bolin, 785 P.2d at 806;  WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 51.12.020 (West 2017). 
66 Bolin, 785 P.2d at 806. 
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service,67 and whether the county was the jurors’ “employer.”68  
The court recognized the involuntary nature of jury service, but 
stated Washington precedent dictated that even involuntary 
employees were eligible for workers’ compensation,69 and found 
that the county was the employer of jurors “by virtue of [the 
jurors’] responsibility to the superior court.”70  Consequently, the 
court held that Washington jurors were eligible for workers’ 
compensation coverage.71 
Therefore, if Barry Stevens was summoned to jury duty in 
Ohio, North Dakota, or Washington, he would be eligible to 
receive workers’ compensation coverage for his injury.  His 
eligibility would be based on any combination of the following: 
his position as a juror resulted from an “appointment for hire,” 
the county can be the “employer” of jurors, his position is not one 
that falls within Ohio’s “official of the state or county” statutory 
exception, and at the same time, he met North Dakota’s 
qualifications for “state officials.” 
3. Public Policy and Finding Jurors Eligible for Workers’ 
Compensation 
In Waggener v. County of Los Angeles,72 public policy was the 
exclusive justification for finding that jurors were eligible for 
workers’ compensation.  That case concerned an individual who, 
while serving jury duty in a criminal trial, slipped and fell out of 
the jury box.  When the injured juror brought negligence and 
premises liability claims against the county, the county sought 
dismissal on the grounds that the Workers’ Compensation Act 
“provide[d] the sole and exclusive forum for redress of plaintiff’s 
complaints against the County.”73 
 
 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 807. 
69 Id. at 806. 
70 Id. at 807. 
71 Id. at 805, 807–08. The court then engaged in further statutory interpretation 
to determine whether the specific injury to the plaintiff, a vehicle accident which 
took place on the plaintiff’s commute from jury duty, met the statutory requirement 
that the injury take place within the course of employment. The court found that, 
because the statute obligated the county to pay for jurors’ transportation, the 
accident was within the scope of employment. Id. at 808. 
72 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 141, 142 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995). 
73 Id. 
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The court began its analysis by noting that there was 
ambiguity as to whether the legislature meant for the California 
Workers’ Compensation Act to cover jurors.74  Next, the court 
acknowledged the existing case law on the issue and that the 
authority overwhelmingly found that jurors were not eligible for 
workers’ compensation.75  The court noted, however, that the 
overwhelming majority reached that conclusion because the 
jurors’ relationships to their counties “d[id] not fit squarely 
within the common law definition of the employment 
relationship.”76  The court then stated that it would not engage in 
“rigid contractual analysis,”77 and declared that “an ‘employment’ 
relationship sufficient to bring the Act into play cannot be 
determined simply from technical contractual or common law 
conceptions of employment but must instead be resolved by 
reference to the history and fundamental purposes underlying 
the [workers’ compensation] Act.”78 
The Waggener court stated that a holding contrary to the 
weight of authority, providing coverage to jurors, was consistent 
with the purpose of the Act—“to protect individuals against the 
special risks of employment.”79  Likewise, the court said the 
broad terms and definitions of the Act were consistent with an 
intent for “comprehensive coverage.”80  In addition, the court 
explained, in detail, the lengths to which jurors go to perform 
jury service for the county and even pointed out that “the 
common term for describing the work of a citizen called to sit on 
a jury is ‘jury service.’ ”81  Finally, the court’s conclusion  
 
 
74 See id. at 143 (“We are therefore called upon to determine whether a juror is 
an employee for purposes of the Act in the absence of a specific pronouncement by 
the Legislature.”). 
75 See id. (“The foregoing cases uniformly conclude that jurors are not 
employees, and are not subject to the provisions of their states’ respective workers’ 
compensation laws . . . .”). 
76 Id. (emphasis added). 
77 Id. 
78 Id. (quoting Laeng v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd., 494 P.2d 1, 4–5 (Cal. 
1972)). 
79 Id. 
80 See id. at 144 (“The Act intends comprehensive coverage of injuries in 
employment. It accomplishes this goal by defining ‘employment’ broadly . . . .”). 
81 See id. (explaining that jurors are subject to county control over almost every 
aspect of their environment and noting that such control can be, in the case of 
sequestration, “extreme”). 
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exemplified its belief that jurors should, as a matter of policy, 
receive workers’ compensation benefits for the service they 
perform: 
In sum, it is wholly consistent with the broad purposes of the 
Act to place upon the County, which benefits from the unique 
and invaluable services provided by jurors, the responsibility to 
insure against injuries which they may sustain in rendering 
such services to the County. Consequently, we conclude that a 
juror who is injured in the course of performing his or her jury 
service is an employee for purposes of the Act.82 
In like manner, other courts have concluded that jurors 
should receive workers’ compensation coverage based on public 
policy.83  For example, in a decision reminiscent of Waggener, the 
Supreme Court of Idaho noted the ever-present potential for 
juror injury and stated that “anyone who ponders even shortly” 
on the possibility of jury service would “feel greatly relieved” to 
know that injured jurors are eligible for workers’ compensation.84  
Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Idaho concluded that it would 
be “far better” for jurors to receive assurance that counties would 
pay for medical expenses arising out of their service.85  In the 
same vein, the Supreme Court of Washington stated that the 
workers’ compensation statute was “better served” by providing 
coverage to jurors.86 
Therefore, if Barry Stevens sustained his injury in 
California, Idaho, or Washington, he would receive workers’ 
compensation coverage and, based on those courts’ position 
towards jurors, maybe even a thank you for his service. 
4. Public Policy and Finding Jurors Ineligible for Workers’ 
Compensation 
In addition to, or in lieu of, statutory interpretation, courts 
have relied on policy considerations to find that jurors are not 
eligible for workers’ compensation.  One such policy is that jurors 
cannot be eligible for workers’ compensation benefits because 
their sole function is to perform a civic duty. Several courts 
 
82 Id. (emphasis added). 
83 See Yount v. Boundary County, 796 P.2d 516, 526–27 (Idaho 1990); Bolin v. 
Kitsap County, 785 P.2d 805, 807–08 (Wash. 1990). 
84 Yount, 796 P.2d at 526. 
85 Id. 
86 Bolin, 785 P.2d at 807. 
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subscribe to this theory.87  In fact, the Supreme Court of Colorado 
typified this perspective when it explained the function of jury 
service: 
When a citizen is summoned to jury service he responds to 
process running in the name of the people, which imports such 
dignity that it commands respect, and is of such force that none 
disobeys. By the majesty of the law, therefore . . . he becomes a 
juror . . . .  He functions as part of the judicial machinery, and is 
as indispensable to its ongoing as is the judge of the court where 
he serves.88 
Thus, several courts respect this obligation and, based on 
both its public and civic nature, treat it as a special circumstance 
wholly separate from employment. 
Courts have also relied on another policy justification for 
precluding jurors from workers’ compensation coverage: jurors, 
unlike the employees typically afforded workers’ compensation 
coverage, do not volunteer to serve.  Indeed, several courts held 
that jury service was distinct from employment because jury 
service was mandated by law, whereas workers’ compensation 
was premised on voluntary consent to work.89  Therefore, if Barry 
Stevens sustained his injury in a jurisdiction holding that jurors 
are distinct from employees because jurors perform a civic duty 
or are compelled to serve, he would not receive workers’ 
compensation benefits. 
 
87 See, e.g., Bd. of Comm’rs v. Evans, 60 P.2d 225, 227 (Colo. 1936) (“The duty to 
serve as a juryman is an obligation to the community in which he resides . . . .”) 
(emphasis added); Metropolitan Dade County v. Glassman, 341 So. 2d 995, 996 (Fla. 
1976) (distinguishing jurors from county employees because jurors answer a calling 
to perform their “duty”). 
88 Evans, 60 P.2d at 226–27. The Supreme Court of Massachusetts also 
surmised this theory quite well: “Jurors do not constitute an independent 
organization or body within the judicial system. They perform legal functions 
imposed upon them in the manner prescribed by law. (T)hey are an appendage, a 
branch, an integral part of the court acting under the authority of the court.” 
O’Malley’s Case, 281 N.E.2d 277, 279 (Mass. 1972) (internal quotations omitted). 
89 See, e.g., Jaskoviak v. Indus. Comm’n, 785 N.E.2d 1026, 1029 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2003) (noting that the claimant could not choose to decline jury duty); Jeansonne v. 
Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 11663 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/28/77); 354 So. 2d 619, 620 
(noting that jurors are “bound by statute to perform”); Lockerman v. Prince George’s 
County, 377 A.2d 1177, 1182 (Md. 1977) (“It is plain that voluntary assent is wholly 
lacking here because a citizen summoned for jury duty simply cannot decline to 
appear and serve.”); Hicks v. Guilford County, 148 S.E.2d 240, 243 (N.C. 1966) 
(analogizing jurors to witnesses testifying under subpoena). 
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III. INCONSISTENCIES IN JURISPRUDENCE 
When these six approaches are taken together, there are 
clear inconsistencies in the courts’ rationales and conclusions.  
Those inconsistencies are presented in this portion of the Note 
for the purpose of illustrating why the issue should not be left to 
the courts.  What follows are examples of courts reaching 
opposite conclusions even though they took similar approaches, 
reviewed similar facts, interpreted similar statutory language, 
applied similar rationales, and aimed to implement similar 
policies. 
A. Whether Jurors Are Appointed 
Courts have provided inconsistent conclusions as to whether 
jurors are “appointed” to serve.  Several courts found that jurors 
are not appointed; rather, they perform a civic duty.90  In fact, the 
Supreme Court of Colorado said that “[i]n no conceivable sense” 
are jurors appointed.91  However, several other courts concluded 
that jurors are appointed.92  In holding the latter, the Ohio 
Supreme Court even specified the process by which jurors were 
appointed:  Candidates were selected by a jury commission to be 
placed in a wheel; they were drawn out of the jury wheel as 
needed; and “when drawn, their selection by the jury commission 
bec[a]me[] a definite appointment . . . .”93  Similarly, when the 
Supreme Court of Idaho held that jurors were appointed for hire, 
it noted that Idaho had an “almost identical . . . process” to the  
 
 
 
90 See Evans, 60 P.2d at 227 (stating that jury service is a duty stemming from 
an obligation to the jurors’ community); Jaskoviak, 785 N.E.2d at 1029 (rejecting 
claimant’s argument that placement on the jury commission’s jury list amounted to 
an appointment for hire); Hicks, 148 S.E.2d at 244 (noting that the juror was 
“neither appointed nor elected to his position of duty”). 
91 Evans, 60 P.2d at 227. 
92 Holmgren v. N.D. Workers Comp. Bureau, 455 N.W.2d 200, 203 (N.D. 1990); 
see also Waggener v. County of Los Angeles, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 141, 142, 144 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1995) (citing CAL. LAB. CODE § 3351 (West 2018)) (noting that the statutory 
definition of “employee” includes “appointed paid public officers” before concluding 
that jurors were employees). 
93 Indus. Comm’n v. Rogers, 171 N.E. 35, 36 (Ohio 1930) (emphasis added). 
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one discussed in Rogers.94  Likewise, the Supreme Court of North 
Dakota reasoned that jurors were appointed through both the 
selection process and the required “jurors’ oaths.”95 
B. Extent of Control Exercised over Jurors 
Courts have relied on both jurors’ autonomy and the extent 
to which jurors are subject to the control of others—typically the 
court and the county—to both grant and deny workers’ 
compensation coverage.  For example, some courts found that 
jurors’ inability to decline service bolstered the conclusion that 
jurors should not receive workers’ compensation.  Those courts 
noted that jurors are “bound by statute to perform,”96 that 
citizens “summoned for jury duty simply cannot decline to appear 
and serve,”97 and even analogized jurors to witnesses testifying 
under subpoena.98  The Supreme Court of Washington, however, 
disregarded that notion.99  Indeed, it held that “[t]he view that 
jurors are not covered because their employment is involuntary 
cannot be reconciled with the cases in this jurisdiction and those 
of our sister states that citizens impressed into various kinds of 
civic service may recover [workers’ compensation benefits].”100 
Similarly, based on the premise that jurors lack control over 
their duties, courts have also reached contrary conclusions 
regarding whether jurors should receive workers’ compensation 
coverage.  For example, several courts reasoned that jurors 
should receive workers’ compensation coverage because they are  
 
 
94 Yount v. Boundary County, 796 P.2d 516, 525 (Idaho 1990). The Yount court 
went even further than the Rogers court when it provided the statutory basis for the 
state’s juror appointment process. Compare id. at 525 n.7., with Rogers, 117 N.E. at 
36. 
95 Holmgren, 455 N.W.2d at 203. 
96 Jeansonne v. Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 11663 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/28/77); 354 
So. 2d 619, 620. 
97 Lockerman v. Prince George’s County, 377 A.2d 1177, 1182 (Md. 1977); see 
also Jaskoviak v. Indus. Comm’n, 785 N.E.2d 1026, 1029 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) (noting 
that the claimant could not choose to decline jury duty); Bd. of Comm’rs v. Evans, 60 
P.2d 225, 226–27 (Colo. 1936) (noting that jurors are “selected,” “summoned,” and 
are not “consulted as to whether or when [they] shall serve, or as to the duration of 
[their] service . . . .”). 
98 Hicks v. Guilford County, 148 S.E.2d 240, 243 (N.C. 1966). 
99 Bolin v. Kitsap County, 785 P.2d 805, 806 (Wash. 1990). 
100 Id. 
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subject to the control of the court.101  The Supreme Court of 
Colorado, however, reasoned that jurors should not receive 
coverage because they are subject to the control of the court.102 
Conversely, courts have reached contrary conclusions 
regarding whether jurors should receive workers’ compensation 
coverage based on the premise that jurors are autonomous.  On 
the one hand, the Supreme Court of North Carolina reasoned 
that jurors were not eligible for workers’ compensation because 
they have extensive control over the performance of their 
duties.103  On the other hand, the Supreme Court of North 
Dakota concluded that jurors were eligible for compensation for 
the same reason: jurors have extensive control of the 
performance of their duties.104 
Comparing Holmgren to Hicks presents a particularly clear 
instance of the inconsistency in how courts determine whether 
jurors are eligible for workers’ compensation.  The extensive 
analysis of juror independence in Holmgren mirrors the analysis 
in Hicks,105 but the courts reached opposite conclusions as to 
 
101 See, e.g., Waggener v. County of Los Angeles, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 141, 144 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1995) (noting that the County controls almost “each and every” aspect of the 
juror’s “work environment” and “whereabouts”); O’Malley’s Case, 281 N.E.2d 277, 
279 (Mass. 1972) (noting that court orders exercise “control and direction” over the 
jurors); Indus. Comm’n v. Rogers, 171 N.E. 35, 36 (Ohio 1930) (noting that the “force, 
authority, finality, and effectiveness of a verdict is wholly dependent upon the 
judgment entered thereon by the court”); Bolin, 785 P.2d at 808 (“jurors under a 
superior court judge’s control are county employees for purposes of the [Workers’ 
Compensation] Act”) (emphasis added). 
102 See Evans, 60 P.2d at 226–27 (noting that jurors do not control matters they 
may decide). 
103 Hicks, 148 S.E.2d at 243–44. 
104 See Holmgren v. N.D. Workers Comp. Bureau, 455 N.W.2d 200, 205, 206 
(N.D. 1990) (noting that jurors are “autonomous” and concluding that jurors should 
receive workers’ compensation coverage). 
105 Compare Hicks, 148 S.E.2d at 243 (“Obviously, a juror is not subject to 
direction and control of county officials as to the manner in which the juror 
discharges his duties, in the sense that an employee in an industry is subject to 
direction by his employer. On the contrary, even the trial judge is expressly 
forbidden to convey to the jury in any manner at any stage of the trial his opinion as 
to how the jury should determine a question of fact.”), with Holmgren, 455 N.W.2d at 
205 (internal quotations and citations omitted) (“[A]lthough jurors must follow the 
law as it is given by the court and apply only that law to the facts as the jurors find 
them, within their own province, jurors are autonomous. [T]hey are given the power 
of decision and are permitted to deliberate in secret and to announce their verdict 
without giving reasons for it.”). 
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whether the independence of jurors warranted workers’ 
compensation coverage.106 
C. Jurors’ Remuneration 
When courts decide whether jurors should receive workers’ 
compensation, they often discuss the fact that jurors receive 
remuneration for their service.107  Some courts said that, among 
other reasons, jurors should receive workers’ compensation 
because, like employees, they receive payment for their 
services.108  Other courts, however, said that jurors should not 
receive workers’ compensation because their payment differs 
from the payment typically disbursed to employees.109  Indeed, 
the latter courts distinguish juror remuneration from typical 
employment remuneration because juror remuneration is 
provided by statute,110 is not based on the number of hours 
worked,111 only amounts to “some slight compensation,”112 and, in 
some instances, jurors may continue to receive their salaries 
from their regular employers while they serve.113 
IV. THE REMEDY: LEGISLATIVE CLARIFICATION 
The value of legislative clarification is apparent in light of 
the existing jurisprudence on this issue.  Most courts looked to 
legislative intent to address the question of whether jurors 
should receive workers’ compensation.114  Some of those courts 
even held that the power to decide the issue was exclusively 
 
106 Compare Hicks, 148 S.E.2d at 244 (concluding that jurors should not receive 
workers’ compensation coverage), with Holmgren, 454 N.W.2d at 205–06 (concluding 
that jurors should receive workers’ compensation coverage). 
107 See, e.g., Jeansonne v. Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 11663 (La. App. 1 Cir. 
12/28/77); 354 So. 2d 619, 620; Holmgren, 455 N.W.2d at 203; Indus. Comm’n v. 
Rogers, 171 N.E. 35, 37 (Ohio 1930). 
108 See Holmgren, 455 N.W.2d at 203; Rogers, 171 N.E. at 37. 
109 See Brouwer v. Metropolitan Dade County, 139 F.3d 817, 819 (11th Cir. 
1998); Jeansonne, 354 So. 2d at 620; O’Malley’s Case, 281 N.E.2d 277, 279 (Mass. 
1972). 
110 Brouwer, 139 F.3d at 819. 
111 Id. 
112 Jeansonne, 354 So. 2d at 620. 
113 O’Malley’s Case, 281 N.E.2d at 279. 
114 E.g., Bd. of Comm’rs v. Evans, 60 P.2d 225, 227 (Colo. 1936); Jaskoviak v. 
Indus. Comm’n, 785 N.E.2d 1026, 1030 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003); Lockerman v. Prince 
George’s County, 377 A.2d 1177, 1180 (Md. 1977). 
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vested in their state legislatures.115  Accordingly, New York 
courts would also look to its state legislature.  However, because 
the current statutory structure of New York’s Workers’ 
Compensation Act fails to expressly mention jurors, a New York 
court confronted with this issue would face the daunting 
challenge of trying to make sense of the existing out-of-state 
jurisprudence, which is laden with inconsistencies.  Indeed, 
Barry Stevens’ future in the courts of New York would be 
uncertain.  In the interest of judicial economy, the legislature 
ought to clarify and resolve this issue to spare the time and 
expense the courts would otherwise incur in addressing this 
issue.  For the reasons that follow, the legislature should clarify 
that jurors should not receive workers’ compensation. 
A. The Policy Behind the New York Workers’ Compensation 
Statute Indicates that Jurors Should Not Be Covered 
The Legislature should specify that jurors are not eligible for 
workers’ compensation because that would comport with the 
policy underlying the enactment of the workers’ compensation 
statute—to mitigate the effects of widespread industrial 
accidents.116  Accordingly, the New York Workers’ Compensation 
Act currently reflects that policy by providing coverage to specific 
categories of “[h]azardous employments.”117  Though it is possible 
for jurors to sustain injuries in the course of their duties, that 
possibility is too remote to qualify jury duty as “hazardous.”118  In 
sum, because the Workers’ Compensation Act is meant to  
 
 
115 See Evans, 60 P.2d at 227 (“The legislative branch of the government has not 
said that a juror is an employee of the county, and it does not lie with the judicial 
branch to belittle the functions of his great office by so declaring.”); Lockerman, 377 
A.2d at 1184 (saying that whether jurors receive coverage is “a matter for legislative 
determination”); Silagy v. State, 253 A.2d 478, 479 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1969) 
(noting that this issue “should be addressed, in the first instance, to the 
Legislature”). 
116 See Epstein, supra note 38, at 775–76; Gabel et al., supra note 32, at 406. 
117 N.Y. WORKERS’ COMP. LAW § 3 (McKinney 2017). 
118 See Yount v. Boundary County, 796 P.2d 516, 526 (Idaho 1990) (noting that 
likelihood of juror injuries is remote, even though substantial injuries are possible); 
Lockerman, 377 A.2d at 1180 (stating that “simple common sense” suggests that 
extending Workers’ Compensation coverage to jurors would the contravene the act’s 
premise). 
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respond to the frequency of injuries sustained in the course of 
“hazardous” employments, allowing jurors to receive workers’ 
compensation coverage would be “manifestly absurd.”119 
Moreover, allowing jurors to receive workers’ compensation 
benefits would not only contravene the policy underlying 
workers’ compensation, but also open the floodgates to further 
amendments that do not comport with the policy behind the act.  
That path could potentially lead to unlimited municipal liability.  
Indeed, those in the performance of civic functions were “clearly 
not contemplated by the Act” and the addition of coverage for 
jurors might lead to coverage for election inspectors, bond 
trustees, appraisers, and even “any person . . . called on for any 
purpose.  There would be no limit to those who could claim 
against the count[ies].”120  Therefore, precluding jurors from 
receiving workers’ compensation coverage would conform with 
the policy supporting the Act and eliminate the possibility for the 
opposite conclusion to contravene the Act. 
B. The Language of New York’s Workers’ Compensation Statute 
Indicates that Jurors Should Not Be Covered 
As previously stated, New York’s Workers’ Compensation 
Act primarily grants coverage to employees that fall within 
enumerated categories of “[h]azardous employments.”121  Not only 
is jury work not hazardous, but it also fails to meet the statutory 
definition of “employment.” New York’s Workers’ Compensation 
Act provides that “employment” exists when a worker conducts 
business for the employer’s “pecuniary gain.”122  It follows, then, 
that jurors are not in an “employment” arrangement because 
they do not act for the financial benefit of New York’s counties; 
they serve a public or a civic duty. 
As applied to municipalities, New York’s Workers’ 
Compensation Act contains a few exceptions to the statutory 
requirement that “employment” must be for the employers’ 
pecuniary gain.  Notably, those exceptions comport with the 
 
119 See Lockerman, 377 A.2d at 1180. 
120  Metropolitan Dade County v. Glassman, 341 So. 2d 995, 996 (Fla. 1976) 
(quoting Leon County v. Sauls, 9 So. 2d 461, 463 (Fla. 1942)). 
121 N.Y. WORKERS’ COMP. LAW § 3 (McKinney 2017). Group 17, which lists the 
employees that municipalities must cover, does not include jurors. Jurors could, 
however, fit in to Group 19, which grants municipalities the option to provide 
coverage to employees not listed in Group 17. Id. 
122 Id. § 2 (McKinney 2017). 
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underlying policy in a way that an exception for jurors would not.  
The exceptions provide that (1) municipalities are required to 
cover employees that work in a “prison reformatory, hospital for 
the mentally ill or hospital maintained or operated by a 
municipal corporation or other subdivision of the state, 
notwithstanding the definitions of the terms ‘employment,’ 
‘employer’ or ‘employee’ ”;123 (2) municipalities are required to 
cover county fire coordinators and deputy county fire 
coordinators;124 (3) municipalities are required to cover county 
sheriffs, undersheriffs, and sheriffs’ deputies, “notwithstanding 
the definition of the term ‘employment’ ”;125 (4) municipalities are 
required to cover civil defense volunteers, including rescue 
squads and auxiliary firefighters, during the course of their 
training;126 and (5) municipalities have the option to provide 
auxiliary police officers with coverage, thereby bringing auxiliary 
police officers within the statutory definition of “employment.”127  
Certainly, providing coverage to prison employees, hospital 
employees, fire coordinators, deputy fire coordinators, sheriffs, 
undersheriffs, sheriffs’ deputies, volunteer rescue squad 
members, auxiliary firefighters, and auxiliary police officers—all 
of whom face threats to their life, health, and safety while at 
work—complies with the underlying policy of protecting against 
injuries sustained in the course of inherently hazardous work.  
The work of jurors, on the other hand, is vastly different from 
those excepted types of work and merits no such protection. 
As applied to state employees, New York’s Workers’ 
Compensation Act contains a similar exception to the statutory 
definition of “employment.”  The statute provides coverage to 
those under “[a]ny employment by the state, including the 
employment of all elected and appointed public officers, 
notwithstanding the definitions of the terms ‘employment,’ 
‘employer’ or ‘employee.’ ”128  The statute, however, restricts state 
employee classification by providing that those “whose wages are 
paid by . . . an employer other than the state . . . shall be deemed 
 
123 Id. § 3 (McKinney 2017). The employees covered by the statute are 
“keeper[s], guard[s], resident physician[s], nurse[s], interne[s], resident interne[s], 
assistant resident interne[s] or orderl[ies].” Id. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. § 2 (McKinney 2017); id. § 3 (McKinney 2017). 
128 Id. § 3 (McKinney 2017). 
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an employee of . . . such employer other than the state . . . .”129  In 
addition, New York law requires many employers to pay their 
employees the daily $40 jury fee, much like a wage, when their 
employees are summoned for jury duty.130  Applying these 
principles, even if jurors, in their role as such, are generally 
under “employment by the state,” many, if not most, jurors could 
not qualify as state employees because their employers pay their 
daily jury fee for the first three days.131 
C. The Chief Policy Arguments for Extending Workers’ 
Compensation Coverage to Jurors Are Without Merit 
The policy arguments in favor of jurors receiving workers’ 
compensation are insufficient to merit juror coverage.  There are 
two chief policy arguments in support of extending workers’ 
compensation coverage to jurors.  The first is that jurors should 
receive workers’ compensation because, outside of workers’ 
compensation, jurors have no means to recover for their injuries 
sustained as jurors; their claims are typically barred by judicial 
immunity and municipal immunity.132   
New York law contains both immunities.  New York’s 
municipal immunity shields public entities, including the 
counties that summon jurors, from liability for discretionary 
actions taken in the performance of governmental functions.133  
Additionally, New York’s judicial immunity protects judges in the 
performance of their judicial functions,134 and extends, in the 
form of quasi-judicial immunity, to those who are “delegated 
judicial or quasi-judicial functions,” because they are “integral 
parts of the judicial process.”135 
Under those doctrines, the court officials who direct, the 
judges who oversee, and the counties that summon jurors are 
immune from suit regarding injuries resulting from those 
 
129 Id. 
130 See N.Y. JUD. LAW § 519 (McKinney 2017) (requiring employers with ten or 
more employees to pay the $40 fee for the first three days of service); id. at § 521. 
131 See id. § 519; id. § 521 (McKinney 2017). 
132 Bolin v. Kitsap County, 785 P.2d 805, 806 (Wash. 1990). 
133 Valdez v. City of New York, 960 N.E.2d 356, 361–62, 18 N.Y. 3d 69, 74–76, 
936 N.Y.S.2d 587, 592–93 (N.Y. 2011). 
134 Mosher-Simons v. County of Allegany, 783 N.E.2d 509, 512, 99 N.Y.2d 214, 
218–20, 753 N.Y.S.2d 444, 447 (N.Y. 2002). 
135 Id. at 512–13; 99 N.Y.2d at 220; 753 N.Y.S.2d at 447 (internal quotations 
omitted). 
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functions.  Though those circumstances are unfortunate for 
injured jurors, they do not warrant adding jurors as a class of 
protected workers under workers’ compensation because the Act 
is meant to protect against hazardous employment, and the work 
of jurors is neither hazardous nor employment.136  Therefore, 
even though injured jurors lack other means of recovery,137 they 
cannot be eligible for workers’ compensation. 
The second chief argument for extending workers’ 
compensation coverage to jurors is that providing coverage to 
jurors is consistent with the legislatures’ broad intention to 
liberally construe and apply workers’ compensation statutes.138  
In fact, New York jurisprudence indicates that the state’s 
Workers’ Compensation Act should be liberally construed.139  For 
the reasons explained, however, permitting jurors to receive 
workers’ compensation contravenes the policy underlying the 
Act.140  Indeed, the liberal construction and purpose argument is 
unpersuasive because, notwithstanding the policy of liberally 
construing the Workers’ Compensation Act, the notion that 
jurors should receive such coverage “disregard[s] [the] clear 
meaning” of workers’ compensation.141  Put simply, even the most 
liberal construction does not permit contravention of purpose. 
D. The Remedy: A Specific Legislative Provision Precluding 
Jurors from Workers’ Compensation Coverage 
The suggested remedy is a simple one.  The legislature 
should specifically preclude jurors from workers’ compensation 
coverage.  In fact, the New York legislature has already done 
 
136 See supra Part IV, Sections A–B. 
137 This could change if the legislature creates a doctrine outside of Workers’ 
Compensation that provides for injured jurors’ medical expenses. 
138 See Waggener v. County of Los Angeles, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 141, 144 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1995) (noting that covering jurors is “wholly consistent with the broad purposes 
of the Act”) (emphasis added); Yount v. Boundary County, 796 P.2d 516, 522 (Idaho 
1990) (noting that Workers’ Compensation law was to be “liberally construed” and 
saying the court’s task was, in pursuit of that end, “to ascertain if the provisions of 
the [Workers’ Compensation] statute[] are capable of being so interpreted.”). 
139 E.g., Neacosia v. N.Y. Power Auth., 649 N.E.2d 1188, 1191, 85 N.Y.2d 471, 
476, 626 N.Y.S.2d 44, 47 (N.Y. 1995); Lemon v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 528 N.E.2d 
1205, 1207, 72 N.Y.2d 324, 326, 532 N.Y.S.2d 732, 734 (N.Y. 1988); Smith v. 
Tompkins Cty. Courthouse, 459 N.E.2d 155, 156, 60 N.Y.2d 939, 941, 471 N.Y.S.2d 
46, 47 (N.Y. 1983). 
140 See Gabel et al., supra note 32, at 406; see also Epstein, supra note 38, at 
776. 
141 Lockerman v. Prince George’s County, 377 A.2d 1177, 1182 n.5 (Md. 1977). 
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that for other types of municipal workers.  For example, the 
portion of the statute that governs municipal employees provides 
that Department of Sanitation employees “shall not be within the 
coverage of this chapter.”142  The legislature need only add that 
“jurors shall not be within the coverage of this chapter.”  
Alternatively, the legislature could take an approach similar to 
the one taken by Congress by specifying, in the definitions 
section of the statute,143 that “employee” does not include those 
“serving as a petit or grand juror.”144  Either way, the legislature 
should properly and decisively settle the issue. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the New York legislature should add a 
provision to the New York Workers’ Compensation Act that 
specifically precludes jurors from coverage.  That amendment 
would comport with the policies underlying the Workers’ 
Compensation Act and potentially save the court system 
considerable time and expense. 
 
 
142 See N.Y. WORKERS’ COMP. LAW § 3 (McKinney 2017). 
143 N.Y. WORKERS’ COMP. LAW § 2 (McKinney 2017). 
144 5 U.S.C. § 8101 (2012). 
